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Abstract: Previous research has reached mixed conclusions about the effect of higher levels of 
immigration on the wages of natives.  This paper reexamines this question using data from the 
Current Population Survey and the Immigration and Naturalization Service and focuses on 
differential effects by skill level.  Using occupation as a proxy for skill, we find that an increase in 
the fraction of foreign-born workers tends to lower the wages of natives in blue collar occupations—
particularly after controlling for endogeneity—but does not have a statistically significant negative 
effect among natives in skilled occupations.  The results also indicate that immigrants adjusting their 
immigration status within the U.S., but not newly arriving immigrants, have a significant negative 
impact on the wages of low-skilled natives.  This suggests that immigrants become closer substitutes 
for natives as they spend more time in the U.S.  
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Does Immigration Affect Wages? A Look at Occupation-Level Evidence 
 
Immigration has accounted for more than one-half of the total labor force growth in the U.S. 
during the last decade.  This influx of immigrants has been disproportionately large in certain 
regions, such as the Midwest and the Southwest, where immigration accounted for over two-thirds of 
labor force growth during the period 1996 to 2003.  Immigrants have also been disproportionately 
concentrated in certain occupations, particularly low skilled occupations such as construction or 
agricultural work (Mosisa, 2002).  This influx of immigrants and their concentration in certain 
regions and occupations raises the question of how immigration affects the wages of natives, 
particularly vulnerable groups such as low-skilled natives.  This study uses data on immigration 
inflows and natives’ wages within occupation groups to examine this issue. 
Most previous studies of the effect of immigration on wages use a cross-area approach that 
compares the number of immigrants in an area with wages in that area.  These studies, such as 
Altonji and Card (1991), Butcher and Card (1991), LaLonde and Topel (1991), and Schoeni (1997), 
typically conclude that immigration has little or no significant negative effect on natives' wages.  As 
noted in many papers, the cross-area approach can yield misleading results if immigrants’ locational 
choices are endogenous, with immigrants going to areas with higher wages.  For example, 
immigrants within a certain educational group tend to settle in areas with relatively high returns to 
that group (Borjas, 2001).  In addition, cross-sectional results are biased if immigration causes 
offsetting migration by natives and previous immigrants or changes in industry mix. 
In response to these potential problems, several studies use factor proportions models to 
estimate the effect of immigration on wages.  Factor proportions models do so by making 
assumptions about the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives (e.g., Borjas, 
Freeman and Katz, 1992, 1997; Jaeger, 1996; Johnson, 1998).  Using reasonable elasticities, such   4
models can yield sizable negative effects at the national level for unskilled workers.  The effect of 
immigration on skilled workers, however, is modest at best in such studies.  Moreover, results from 
factor proportions analysis tend to be sensitive to changes in the underlying assumptions of the 
model, such as the functional form and the number of factors (Leamer, 2000).  In a recent study, 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005) show that by relaxing some typical assumptions and allowing for 
imperfect substitution between native and foreign-born workers as well as endogenous capital 
accumulation, these models can predict positive wage effects of immigration on natives.   
  A few studies focus on the effect of immigration within occupations or skill groups.  Using 
data from the 1990 Census, Card (2001) estimates the relationship between immigrant inflows and 
wages for six occupational groups in 175 large U.S. cities.  Most of his results indicate significant 
negative effects, which generally increase in magnitude when instrumental variables techniques are 
used to control for endogeneity.  Card does not discuss whether the effects differ between skilled and 
unskilled workers.  Using a similar approach but at the national level with data from the 1991 
Current Population Survey (CPS), Camarota (1997) finds a negative association between 
immigration and wages within low-skilled occupations.  Both of these studies use a single year of 
cross-sectional data. 
Two studies use multiple cross sections of national-level data to look at effects by occupation 
or education groups.  Friedberg (2001) uses Israeli micro data to study the impact of Russian 
immigration by occupation on Israeli wages and employment.  Using an instrumental variables 
strategy, she does not find evidence of an adverse wage effect on natives whether in a pooled sample 
or in regressions by high and low skill level.  Using several years of data from the Census and the 
CPS, Borjas (2003) finds that higher immigrant inflows within education and experience groups—  5
which proxy for skill—are negatively associated with wages of male natives at the national level, 
particularly for workers who did not attend college.   
  This study estimates the effect of immigration inflows on wages within occupational groups 
using data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Current Population 
Survey (CPS).
1  Our approach offers several contributions to the literature.  First, no study has used 
INS data on new recipients of lawful permanent resident status to examine the effects of immigration 
on wages even though the data present several advantages.  As discussed below, the INS data contain 
a complete count of new legal immigrants and allow us to distinguish between newly arriving 
immigrants and those who adjust status while already in the U.S.  In addition, we use several years 
of data whereas most previous cross-area and occupation-level studies relied on a cross-sectional 
approach.  Using multiple years of data allows us to control for unobservable local area effects, 
which was not possible in cross-area studies that used only one year of data.  Our approach thus 
blends the multiple-year, skill-level analysis of Friedberg (2001) and Borjas (2003) with the single-
year, cross-area methodology of most previous studies, such as Card (2001). 
The next section discusses the effects of immigration on wages from a theoretical 
perspective.  We then discuss the data used to examine the relationship between immigration and 
natives’ wages at the occupational group level; we focus on professional, service-related, and manual 
labor occupation groups during a seven-year period, 1994-2000, at the metropolitan area level.  The 
results indicate that, after controlling for endogeneity, larger immigrant inflows reduce average 
wages among natives working in manual labor occupations—the least skilled group—but do not 
appear to have a significant negative effect among natives in professional and service occupations, in 
which workers tend to be more skilled.  Immigrants who are already present in the U.S. and who 
                                                 
1 The INS was renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services in March 2003.  For simplicity, we refer to 
it as the INS here.   6
adjust from nonimmigrant status have a more negative effect on natives’ wages than do newly 
arrived immigrants, indicating that assimilation may lead to increased substitutability of immigrants 




Immigration inflows can negatively or positively impact natives’ wages, depending on the 
degree of substitution or complementarity between immigrant and native workers and a number of 
other factors.  Because there is already a large theoretical literature, we do not present a formal 
model of the effect of immigration on natives’ wages but simply review the underlying reasons why 
immigration might affect natives’ wages and in what direction.
2 
The degree of substitution between immigrants and natives is a key determinant of the effect 
of immigration on native wages.  Holding capital constant and assuming constant returns to scale 
production technology, an increase in labor supply due to immigration will lower wages if 
immigrants and natives are substitutes and labor supply is not perfectly elastic with respect to 
wages.
3  The magnitude of the negative effect increases with the degree of substitution between 
immigrants and natives and with the size of the immigrant inflow.  If immigrants are a complement 
for natives in production, in contrast, immigration will boost natives’ wages. 
The degree of substitution between immigrants and natives is likely to vary across skill levels 
and over time.  Substitution is likely to be easier in industries with less skilled workers because 
employees are more interchangeable and training costs are lower than in industries with skilled 
workers.  In skilled jobs, the need for English language proficiency and institutional knowledge may 
                                                 
2 For formal models, we refer readers to, among others, Borjas (1999), Greenwood and Hunt (1995), Johnson (1998) and 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005). 
3 These assumptions can be relaxed to accommodate changes in the relative prices of goods and in the use of capital 
versus labor inputs.  See Chapter 4 in Smith and Edmonston (1997) for a more general model.   7
make it difficult for employers to substitute immigrants for native workers.  Some skilled 
professions, such as physicians, also involve licensing requirements, limiting the substitutability for 
natives of immigrants educated and trained abroad. 
 Differences in the quality and relevance of education and experience acquired abroad also 
make skilled immigrants less substitutable for skilled natives.  Evidence suggests returns to skill are 
generally lower for education and experience acquired in the home country (Friedberg, 2000; Duleep 
and Regets, 1999).  Moreover, skill transferability, the degree to which immigrants can use human 
capital acquired in their home country at U.S. jobs, tends to be higher for unskilled jobs than for 
skilled positions (Gallo and Bailey, 1996).  As a result, skilled immigrants experience a larger 
earnings penalty than unskilled immigrants.  If immigrants assimilate over time and acquire more 
U.S. skills, such as institutional knowledge and language proficiency, the earnings penalty falls and 
immigrants are more competitive with natives for jobs.  Duleep and Regets (2002) and Hu (2000) 
both find that immigrants with lower initial wages have faster subsequent wage growth, facts that are 
consistent with a model of earnings assimilation.  Hence, as immigrants become more substitutable 
for native workers over time, more adverse wage effects may follow.   
In order to capture differential effects by skill level, we use occupation as a proxy for skill in 
our empirical model below.  If the elasticity of substitution is greater among unskilled workers than 
among skilled workers, as we hypothesize, the effect of immigration on wages should be larger in 
unskilled occupations than in skilled occupations.  The degree of complementarity (or substitution) 
between immigrants in a given occupation and natives in another occupation also influences natives’ 
wages, a topic we do not explore in this study; studies suggest that most such cross-elasticities are 
small (Hamermesh, 1993).   8
Another factor that influences the effect of immigration on wages is changes in capital.  
Immigrants might add to the capital stock, both initially if they bring savings when they migrate and 
over time (Chiswick, Chiswick and Karras, 1992).  If immigration adds to the capital stock, natives’ 
wages might rise if capital is a complement to labor, particularly skilled labor.  Unskilled labor, in 
contrast, appears to be a substitute for capital (Hamermesh, 1993).  Capital also may move across 
industries and areas in response to immigration inflows.  Such movements in capital could at least 
partially counterbalance the negative effect of an increase in labor supply on natives’ wages.  The 
empirical model we present below does not control for capital because we do not have measures of 
capital at the occupation and area level; since we only examine a seven-year period, ignoring 
changes in capital may not be as problematic as it would be over a longer period of time.  The area 
fixed effects will pick up time-invariant cross-area differences in the existing capital stock. 
The elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages also influences the impact of immigration 
on wages.  Natives and previous immigrants might respond to immigration-induced changes in 
wages by altering their labor supply, moving to a different area, or upgrading or downgrading their 
skills.
4  Such changes would reduce any negative effect of immigrant inflows on wages.  Studies 
have not reached a consensus as to whether offsetting migration occurs in response to immigrant 
inflows (e.g., Card, 2001; Frey, 1995; Kritz and Gurak, 2001).  Because we examine only a seven-
year period here, our estimates of the impact of immigration on wages are probably more negative 
than the long-run effect.  In the long run, endogenous shifts in labor supply (as well as changes in the 
capital stock) would likely lead to less negative estimates than any found here. 
Finally, immigration inflows may lead to changes in output mix that cushion any wage 
impact on natives.  Previous studies suggest that immigration may lead to changes in the output mix 
                                                 
4 See Chiswick (1989) for a model of how natives adjust their human capital to minimize adverse wage effects due to 
immigration.   9
within areas, with industries intensive in low-skilled labor expanding in or moving to areas with 
large numbers of immigrants (Altonji and Card, 1991; Hanson and Slaughter, 2002).  Such changes 
in production should increase the demand for labor and thereby reduce any negative effects of 
immigration on wages.  Similarly, immigration may lead to scale effects, with demand for output 
increasing in response to immigration; an increase in output demand would raise demand in factor 
markets, putting upward pressure on wages.  Such effects would also at least partially offset any 
negative effect of immigration on wages   
As discussed below, we instrument for changes in the labor supply as a consequence of 
immigration to help control for the above factors.  Instrumenting, as well as including area fixed 
effects, also controls for endogeneity bias due to immigrants settling in areas that pay high wages, 
which would upward bias the estimated coefficients away from finding an adverse effect.  We 
further include interactions between area and year fixed effects in some specifications in order to  
control for changes in cross-area wage differences that might influence migration patterns. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
  To estimate the effect of immigration on natives’ wages, we regress the average earnings of 
natives in occupation group o on the fraction of workers in that occupation group who are foreign 
born and other variables, or 
 
  t s o t s o t s o t s o t s o T S O X I w , , , , , , , , ln ε τ σ ω γ β α + + + + + + =  (1) 
 
where s indexes areas and t indexes years.  The measure of wages is the log of real average hourly 
wages for natives in a given occupation group, area and year.   10
The variable I in Equation 1 is the number of new legal immigrants with a given occupation 
group relative to total employment in that occupation group.  If an area experiences an influx of 
immigrants within a given set of occupations, this fraction rises, reflecting the increase in the relative 
labor supply of immigrants.  The underlying hypothesis is that occupations and areas experiencing 
larger inflows of immigrants relative to the total number of workers in that occupation and area 
should experience larger declines in wages, and the magnitude of the decline depends on how 
substitutable immigrants are for other workers.  As noted below, a large number of cells in our data 
have the immigrant share variable equal to zero.  We therefore do not log the immigrant share 
variable and interpret its estimated coefficient as an elasticity; instead, the estimated coefficient of 
the immigrant share variable indicates the average percent change in wages for a 1 percentage point 
increase in new immigrants as a share of all workers. 
The vector X controls for the average demographic characteristics of workers in that 
occupation.  We control for the fraction of native-born workers who are female, black, married, and 
union members.  We also control for the distribution of workers across five-year age groups and 
three of four education groups (less than high school, high school, some college, and college 
graduates). 
All regressions include a full set of area, occupation and year fixed effects in order to control 
for unobservable determinants of earnings within an area, occupation or year.  We also include area-
specific time trends and area* year interactions in some specifications.  Pooling seven years of data 
allows us to control for unobserved determinants of wages that are both constant within areas over 
time and changing by year; most previous cross-area studies could not control for such factors 
because they used cross-sectional data.  We White-correct the standard errors in order to control for   11
heteroscedasticity and weight observations by the total number of native-born workers in the 
occupation, area and year. 
  We estimate Equation 1 by pooling observations for each of the three occupation groups 
examined here.  The immigrant share variable, I, is interacted with an indicator variable for each 
occupation group in order to allow the effect of immigration to differ across skill categories.    
Because we have only seven years of data and therefore limited degrees of freedom, we constrain the 
effects of the variables measuring worker characteristics and the area and year fixed effects and 
interactions to be the same across occupation groups. 
Endogeneity bias is a concern because immigration into an area may not be independent of 
local wages or wage growth.  We use two methods to address this problem.  First, we include area-
specific linear time trends or area* year fixed effects in some specifications, which controls for area 
and time-specific factors that affect immigrants’ locational choices, such as relatively high wage 
growth.  Second, we utilize an instrumental variables approach.  This requires an instrument 
correlated with the influx of immigrants into a given MSA and occupation but uncorrelated with 
unobserved factors that drive wage growth. 
We use immigrants who are admitted to the U.S. in a given year as the spouse of a U.S. 
citizen by occupation group, area, and year as our instrument.  We restrict these immigrant spouses 
of U.S. citizens to newly arriving immigrants and immigrants adjusting from a non-work, non-
student related status (many of these are tourists); in other words, we construct the instrumental 
variable to exclude immigrant spouses whose location choice or occupation might depend on relative 
returns.  For this reason, the instrument does not include immigrant spouses who convert from work-
related visas (e.g., H-1Bs), student visas, refugee status, or entry without inspection (unauthorized or 
illegal) status.  The instrument includes only those immigrants married to a U.S. citizen who are   12
either new arrivals in the U.S. or adjusting from a status in which they were not eligible to work 
legally in the U.S. (such as temporary visitor for pleasure—tourist—visas).
5  Because an immigrant 
is typically not eligible to become a naturalized citizen for five years after receiving a green card, the 
immigrants who compose our instrument are unlikely to be married to naturalized citizens who 
immigrated to the U.S. and settled in a particular area because of the potential future returns to the 
occupation in that specific area of the spouse who is now receiving a green card.
6  Only about 37 
percent of the immigrants who compose our instrument are adjusting status (the others are new 
arrivals), and over 84 percent of those had an unexpired tourist visa (which does not allow the holder 
to work legally and, at the time, had a maximum allowable duration of one year). 
Constructed this way, immigrant spouses of U.S. citizens are an effective instrument because 
they are likely to be tied movers.  These foreign-born spouses immigrate for family reunification 
reasons and settle where their citizen spouse lives.  As a result, their location choice is surely less 
affected by area-specific wage growth in their reported occupation group than choices made by 
other, non-tied movers.  Several studies buttress this view.  Mincer (1978) models family migration 
decisions and shows that tied movers tend to have higher unemployment rates and lower earnings.  
Jaeger (2000) reports that, among major admission categories, the location choices of spouses of 
U.S. citizens are the least responsive to local area economic conditions; indeed, he finds a significant 
positive association between the spouses’ location choices and the change in the unemployment rate.  
Interestingly, spouses of U.S. citizens are also the most geographically dispersed and educationally 
diverse group among the categories Jaeger investigates.  Chiswick (1999) also makes the point that 
noneconomic reasons drive the migration of certain groups and, as a result, such movers have higher 
                                                 
5 Although immigrants adjusting from entry without inspection status also could not work legally, they are more likely to 
have been working in the U.S. than many other categories of adjusters who were not authorized to work.  We therefore 
do not include them in our instrument.   13
unemployment rates and lower earnings than statistically comparable ‘economic’ migrants.  
Carrington et al. (1996) model a similar phenomenon in their work on endogenous moving costs; 
they suggest that in the presence of chain migration, migration costs may be falling at the same time 
that wage gaps are shrinking.  This may lead to rising migration into a destination which is 
experiencing a decline in relative wage growth.   
  There is limited information available on the characteristics of immigrant spouses, although 
the INS data discussed below (and presented in Table 2) suggest they are much younger and more 
likely to be female than immigrants who enter under other preference categories.  Male immigrant 
spouses are concentrated among manual labor occupations; about 69 percent of immigrant spouses 
reporting manual labor occupations are male versus 48 percent and 42 percent for immigrants 
reporting professional and service-related occupations, respectively. The INS data have no 
information whatsoever on the characteristics of the citizen spouses who sponsor these immigrants, 
but CPS data offer some clues.  CPS data indicate that most U.S. citizen spouses of recent 
immigrants work (88 percent of male spouses and 68 percent of female spouses) and about two-
thirds of these citizen spouses earn more than their immigrant spouses.  In addition, 69 percent of 
citizen spouses have as much or more education as their recent immigrant spouses.
7  Jasso et al. 
(2000), using the New Immigrant Survey Pilot from 1996, also find that citizen sponsors have higher 
education levels than their immigrant spouses.
8   Taken together, this evidence supports our 
assumption that, on average, immigrant spouses are more like tied movers and that the couple’s 
location decision is not driven by the new immigrant’s earnings potential, at least not initially.   
                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Data from the CPS indicate that, among U.S. citizens married to recent immigrants, the citizen is native born in about 
60 percent of couples. 
7 The CPS sample (based on 1994-1998) is of citizens married to foreign-born persons who report arriving in the U.S. 
within the last 5-6 years. 
8 In addition, they show that citizen wives who sponsor husbands for immigration tend to be much less educated than 
citizen husbands who sponsor wives.  This likely means that citizen wives who sponsor husbands are more likely to be 
from Mexico and Central America in this time period.   14
It should also be noted that the spouses of U.S. citizens are not subject to a quota or admitted 
on the basis of skills, so their occupation plays no direct role in whether they become immigrants.  
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) report that these “marital immigrants” are less skilled than are 
immigrants admitted for employment-based reasons at the time they receive lawful permanent 
resident (LPR) status.  They also find that marital immigrants experience considerable occupational 
upgrading over time in the U.S., suggesting that they become more substitutable for natives as 
duration of U.S. residence increases.  Moreover, during the 1990s, the simple act of filing paperwork 
with the INS made a person fairly immobile geographically.  The INS struggled with huge backlogs 
and lost thousands of files (Holmes, 2000).  In this environment, few applicants risked transferring 
their casework from one district to another, as would be required in the case of most interstate 
moves.  Immigrant spouses adjusting their status therefore may not have moved across areas in 
response to wage differentials based on their skill level. 
 
Data 
  We use data on employment and earnings from the outgoing rotations groups of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and immigration data from the INS.  Both data sets are for the period 1994 
to 2000; the CPS data are for calendar years while the INS data are for fiscal years.
9  We focus on 
three occupation groups: professional (executives/managers and professionals, such as teachers and 
doctors); service-related (clerical workers, which includes all administrative support workers; sales; 
and service workers); and manual laborers (precision production, craft, and repair, which consists of 
more skilled blue-collar jobs; operator, fabricators, and laborers, which is composed of less skilled 
                                                 
9 The difference implicitly allows for a one-quarter lag in effects.   15
blue collar jobs; and farm workers).
10  We use these relatively broad occupational groups because the 
groupings capture the set of occupations for which immigrants who report working in a particular 
occupation, are likely to be substitutable for natives.  For example, immigrants who report working 
as an agricultural laborer can also probably work in an unskilled manufacturing job but not in a 
clerical or professional job, and immigrants who were skilled blue-collar workers in their home 
country may work in unskilled blue-collar jobs in the U.S., at least initially.
11  Using broad 
occupational groups also addresses bias arising from the possibility that natives change occupations 
in response to immigration. 
  The primary data set we use is the CPS, a monthly household survey that focuses on labor 
market outcomes.  Since 1994, the survey has included questions about nativity, including country of 
birth and year of arrival in the U.S. (in intervals).  From all employed native-born individuals aged 
16 and older, we constructed measures of average hourly wages and total employment within the 
three occupation groups.  The controls for the distribution of workers across 5-year age groups, four 
educational groups, sex, race, marital status, and union membership that are included in the 
regressions are also constructed from the CPS data. 
We then constructed three measures of immigration by combining the CPS data with INS 
data and creating ratios of new immigrants over total employment for each MSA, year and 
occupational group.  The INS data we use are the universe of new lawful permanent residents, also 
                                                 
10 We include farm workers because they often reside and work in cities during the off season.  About 2.7 percent of the 
immigrant sample and 1.5 percent of the native-born sample are farm workers.  Average hourly earnings among sales 
workers are similar to those among clerical workers and significantly higher than average earnings in the low-skill 
occupational group, so we classify sales workers as medium skilled. 
11 Using the March 1995-1998 CPSs, we examined transition rates across occupation last year and occupation this year 
for workers who reported being recent immigrants and not present in the U.S. last year.  Using the INS's 25 occupation 
groups, over 95 percent of these immigrants reported being within the same group last year and this year; using our three 
groups, over 97 percent were in the same group.  Patterns among those immigrants who switched occupations underlie 
the classification of occupations across our three groups; for example, among persons who reported a sales occupation 
for year t and a non-sales occupation for year t+1, about one-third were in clerical jobs and almost one-half in service 
jobs in year t+1.   16
known as “green card” recipients.  Our sample includes all new lawful permanent residents aged 16-
64 who report an occupation.  The INS data list 25 occupations, which are more detailed for skilled 
workers (e.g., architects) than for unskilled workers (e.g., operators, fabricators, and laborers).
12  We 
drop individuals who report their occupation as homemaker, student, unemployed, or retired and 
collapse the remaining occupations into our three occupational groups.
13  The INS data do not report 
individuals’ earnings or educational attainment. 
The INS data offer several advantages compared with other data sources that include 
information on nativity.  The INS data are a complete count of all new lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs), and they include the preference category under which immigrants were admitted, such as 
spouse of lawful permanent resident, spouse of U.S. citizen, priority worker with extraordinary 
ability, or refugee.  As discussed above, we exploit the fact that some of these groups are exempt 
from immigration quotas to construct our instrumental variable.  The INS data also distinguish 
between LPRs who are newly arriving in the U.S. and those already present and converting from 
another visa status, such as H1-B.  The INS data report the most recent year of admission for those 
individuals converting from nonimmigrant status.  The main disadvantages of the INS data are that 
they do not include other non-immigrants or illegal aliens and they contain a limited set of personal 
characteristics.  Greenwood, McDowell and Trabka (1991) further describe the advantages and 
shortcomings of the INS data. 
We use total new LPRs based on the INS data and then separate new LPRs into newly 
arriving immigrants and immigrants adjusting status.  Each immigration measure is computed as a 
                                                 
12 We also tried running the regressions using the most detailed level of occupation available in the INS data, but most of 
the results were inconclusive because of the small cell sizes in many occupations and areas. 
 
13 About 19 percent of immigrants aged 16-64 do not report an occupation, another 11 percent report being unemployed 
or retired, 13 percent report being a student and about 17 percent report being a homemaker.  For comparison, in the 
1994-1998 CPS ORGs about 55 percent of recent (last 5-6 years) immigrants are employed at the survey date.   17
share of total workers (using the CPS data to construct the denominators).  We distinguish between 
newly-arriving immigrants and those adjusting status because the foreign born who are already 
present in the U.S. but are only now receiving LPR status are likely to be more substitutable for 
natives than newly arriving immigrants for the reasons discussed above.  In addition, immigrants 
adjusting their status are already working in the U.S. in the occupation reported in the data, whereas 
immigrants newly arriving in the U.S. report their occupation in their home country (unless they are 
admitted under employment-based preferences).  As noted above, this partially motivates our use of 
broad occupational categories. About 44 percent of new LPRs in our data are adjusting status, most 
commonly from temporary visitor for pleasure or H-1 visas, refugee status, or "entry without 
inspection" status (each accounting for about 15 percent within those adjusting status).  The average 
time between receipt of LPR status and the most recent year of admission for those adjusting status 
is about four years, and over 50 percent of adjusters reported converting within three years. 
We conduct the analysis at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level because MSAs more 
closely approximate labor markets than do states.
14  Results from state-level data are similar to the 
MSA-level results shown here.  The INS data are by zip code of intended residence (by MSA for 
1999 and 2000), which we merged with the metropolitan area codes in the CPS.  The final sample 
consists of 5205 observations; it is an unbalanced panel of observations for 283 MSAs over 7 years 
(1994-2000) and 3 occupations.
15  There are no new immigrants in 527 occupation, area, and year 
cells; these observations have Io,s,t equal to zero. 
                                                 
14 We note that the immigrants who settle in urban areas may differ from those who live in other areas.  Immigrants tend 
to initially settle in urban areas where other immigrants live and then move over time to areas with lower concentrations 
of immigrants. 
 
15 In robustness tests we ran the same regressions on a balanced panel.  The number of MSAs falls to 214 (many of the 
smaller MSAs fall out of the sample), but the results are qualitatively similar.   18
Table 1 reports the fraction of workers in each occupation group who are LPRs (columns 1-
3), the fraction of LPRs who are sponsored by citizen spouses (columns 4-6), and natives’ average 
wages (column 7).  Column 1 shows the fraction of workers who are new LPRs, while columns 2 
and 3 show the share of workers made up of new LPRs adjusting status versus newly arriving.  
Although the U.S. granted over 650,000 persons LPR status each year during our sample period, the 
number of new immigrants relative to total workers in each occupation group is small.  The influx of 
new LPRs represents about 0.25 percent of all workers in the manual labor and professional 
categories, but only 0.16 percent of all service workers.  In all three cases, new LPRs understate total 
foreign-born inflows, since new arrivals are not necessarily permanent (i.e., they are non-
immigrants) nor are they necessarily legal (i.e., illegal immigrants).
16  Among green card holders, 
new arrivals outnumber adjusters in all categories, but the difference is much smaller among 
professionals, as columns 2 and 3 indicate.   
Columns 4-6 of Table 1 show the number of spouses of U.S. citizens who are new green 
cards holders, non-work non-student adjusters, or new arrivals (all are expressed as a fraction of total 
new LPRs in each occupation).  Almost 16 percent of LPRs in our sample were admitted as the 
spouse of a U.S. citizen, with slightly larger fractions of spousal immigration among service workers 
and fewer among professionals.  The last column in the table reports real average hourly wages of 
natives as calculated from the CPS data. 
The INS data are limited in scope, but Table 2 gives some further detail about the 
characteristics of spousal immigrants.  Comparing new LPRs who are spouses to all other LPRs, 
spousal immigrants are younger and more likely to be female.  They are also more likely to be from 
                                                 
16 The INS data are not a perfect count of all foreign-born workers entering an occupation for several reasons.  Not all 
immigrants work in the U.S. in the occupation indicated to the INS at the time they received legal permanent resident 
status (some immigrants also may live in an area other than that reported to the INS).  In addition, the data do not include   19
Mexico, less likely to be from China, less likely to be professionals and more likely to be service-
sector workers.    
 
Results 
  Table 3 shows OLS and 2SLS estimates of the relationship between natives’ wages and new 
immigrant shares by occupation group.  As indicated in the table, we show specifications with MSA 
fixed effects, with MSA fixed effects and MSA-specific time trends, and finally with MSA fixed 
effects and MSA*year interactions.  Including the area fixed effects controls for time-invariant 
MSA-level determinants of earnings, such as differences in the cost of living, and helps control for 
endogeneity.  MSA*year interactions control further for MSA-level differences that vary over time.  
The endogeneity bias diminishes as more controls are added for area and year-specific effects, with 
all of the coefficients for the immigrant share variable declining across the columns (albeit not 
always significantly).  Consider the OLS estimates of the effect on manual laborers as an example: 
adding area-specific time trends reduces the coefficient from -0.016 to -0.020, and adding area*year 
interactions further reduces the coefficient to -0.021. 
Table 3 also shows that the effect of immigrant inflows on natives’ wages varies across 
occupation groups.  In the OLS specifications, higher immigrant shares are generally associated with 
positive wage effects on more skilled natives and negative effects on less skilled natives.  A 1 
percentage point increase in the LPR share is associated with an increase in native-born 
professionals’ average wages of 3.7 percent and a decrease in native-born manual workers’ wages of 
2.1 percent, controlling for area*year fixed effects in the OLS specification (column 3).  There is no 
statistically significant effect on service-sector workers. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
illegal aliens and nonimmigrants, and immigrants already present in the U.S. move between occupations.  Nonetheless, 
the numbers should be well correlated with the inflow of immigrants into occupations and areas.   20
It bears noting that a percentage point increase in the flow of new legal immigrants represents 
at least a four-fold increase in the number of LPRs (from 0.25 to 1.25 percent of professional 
workers), not a likely event.  Evaluating the wage effects at the means given in Table 1 gives a more 
comparable measure: the effect of all immigrants, respectively, on professional, service and manual 
workers’ wages among natives is 0.9, 0.2, and -0.5 percent (when area*year interactions are 
included).  The interpretation of these effects is that average wages for natives who are manual 
laborers are about 0.5 percent lower as a result of inflows of new LPRs into their occupational group 
each year. 
The OLS regression results in Table 3 are biased if immigrants settle in the areas that offer 
relatively high wages or wage growth for their occupations and the area fixed effects and area*year 
interactions do not fully control for this endogeneity.  We therefore instrumented for the new LPRs 
with the number of immigrants in the INS data who receive green cards because they are spouses of 
U.S. citizens, as discussed above.  The first-stage results are reported in Appendix Table 1.  The 
instruments are all positively related to the LPR share, as expected, and strongly statistically 
significant.   
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results.  As expected, 
instrumenting for LPR shares produces uniformly more negative effects.  The positive wage effects 
go to zero for professionals and, for manual laborers, the wage effect remains statistically significant 
and becomes more adverse (falling from -0.021 to -0.030 in our preferred specification with 
area*year fixed effects).  When using spouses of citizens as the instrument and evaluating the 2SLS 
estimates at the means in Table 1, low-skilled natives’ wages are about 0.8 percent lower as a result 
of the inflow of LPRs into their occupation group each year.  The results suggest the wage effects on 
the other two, more-skilled occupation groups are essentially zero.   21
  The fact that wage impacts vary by immigrant type is as interesting as the variation by skill 
level.  Table 4 shows the same regressions as in Table 3 but breaks down the immigrant share by 
LPRs who are adjusting status and those who are new arrivals.  Interestingly, the adverse wage 
impacts are concentrated wholly among adjusters.  According to our 2SLS results, newly arriving 
immigrants have a zero wage impact on less- and medium-skilled native workers and a positive 
impact on native professionals.  The lack of an adverse wage effect on manual laborers could be due 
to the lack of substitutability of newly arriving immigrants for natives.  Friedberg (2001) similarly 
argues that evidence of a positive wage impact of newly arrived Russian immigrants on the wages of 
Israeli natives suggests that new immigrants are not very substitutable for native workers.  In 
contrast, immigrants who are adjusting status exert either no effect or a significant negative effect on 
natives’ wages depending on the occupation group.  Adjusters likely have more U.S. experience, 
more U.S.-specific social and human capital and better English language skills than newly arriving 
immigrants, on average.  Our findings are consistent with immigrant assimilation increasing the 
substitutability of immigrants for native workers and hence the wage impacts on natives becoming 
more adverse over time. 
  
Conclusion 
  In this paper, we take another look at how immigration affects the wages of U.S. natives.  
Findings in this literature are dominated by evidence of a modest but significant negative wage 
impact on unskilled natives, but there is little evidence on how other, more skilled workers are 
impacted by immigration.  We address this question in several ways.  First, we use INS data on new 
legal immigrants together with CPS data for 1994-2000.  In order to allow wage effects to vary by   22
worker skill level, we devise three occupational categories, ranging from manual laborers at the 
bottom of the skill range to professionals and executives at the top of the skill range. 
  Using area fixed effects, area*year interactions, and an innovative instrumental variable, we 
find two sets of interesting results.  When instrumenting for new legal immigrant shares, negative 
wage impacts are small in size but highly statistically significant and concentrated among low-skill, 
blue-collar occupations.  For this group, we find wage effects around negative 0.1 percent for a 10 
percent increase in the share of workers who are new immigrants.  We find no evidence of adverse 
wage impacts on medium- and high-skilled native workers.  In fact, increases in the newly arriving 
immigrant share of workers within professional jobs actually have positive wage effects, suggesting 
there may be complementarities between native workers and newly arrived immigrants in the top 
skill categories. 
The magnitudes of the wage effects—not just the signs—also appear closely related to both 
the skill group and the level of U.S. experience of the immigrant group.  Wage effects generally 
become more negative as skill levels decrease.  Wage effects also become more negative as 
immigrants’ time in the U.S. increases.  Although increases in the share of newly arrived immigrants 
have no statistically significant negative impact on the wages of low-skilled natives, increases in the 
share of those who are already in the U.S. when they adjust status have a small but significant 
negative effect on low-skilled native wages.  These findings suggest that the process of assimilation 
makes immigrants more substitutable for natives and may increase wage competition.  An important 
caveat to our findings is that we only examine the impact of new legal immigrants, not total inflows.  
Because illegal immigrants are likely concentrated in low-skill occupations, the total effect of 
immigrant inflows on low-skilled natives is likely more adverse than our estimates suggest.   23
References 
 
Altonji, Joseph C., and David Card (1991). “The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market 
Outcomes of Less-skilled Natives.” In Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, ed. John M. 
Abowd and Richard B. Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 201-234. 
 
Borjas, George J. (1999). “The Economic Analysis of Immigration.” In Handbook of Labor 
Economics, Vol 3, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1697-1760. 
 
Borjas, George J. (2001). “Does Immigration Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market?” Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity: 69-133. 
 
Borjas, George J. (2003). “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the 
Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (November): 
1335-1374. 
 
Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman, and Lawrence F. Katz (1992). “On the Labor Market 
Impacts of Immigration and Trade.” In Immigration and the Work Force: Economic Consequences 
for the United States and Source Areas, ed. George J. Borjas and Richard B. Freeman. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 213-244. 
 
Borjas, George J., Richard B. Freeman, and Lawrence F. Katz (1997). “How Much Do Immigration 
and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes.” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity: 1-90. 
 
Butcher, Kristin F. and David Card (1991). “Immigration and Wages: Evidence from the 1980’s.” 
American Economic Review 81 (May): 292-296. 
 
Camarota, Steven A. (1997). “The Effect of Immigrates on the Earnings of Low-Skilled Native 
Workers: Evidence from the June 1991 Current Population Survey.” Social Science Quarterly 78 
(June): 417-431. 
 
Card, David (2001). “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of 
Higher Immigration.” Journal of Labor Economics 19 (January): 22-64. 
 
Card, David, and John DiNardo (2000). “Do Immigrant Inflows Lead to Native Outflows?” 
American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings 90 (May): 360-367. 
 
Carrington, William J., Enrica Detragiache and Tara Vishwanath (1996). “Migration with 
Endogenous Moving Costs.” American Economic Review 86 (September): 909-930. 
 
Chiswick, Barry R. (1999). “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?” American Economic Review 
Papers and Proceedings (May): 181-185. 
 
Chiswick, Carmel U. (1989). “The Impact of Immigration on the Human Capital of Natives.” 
Journal of Labor Economics. 7 (October): 464-486. 
   24
Chiswick, Carmel U., Barry R. Chiswick, and Georgios Karras (1992). “The Impact of Immigrants 
on the Macroeconomy.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 37 (December): 
279-316. 
 
Duleep, Harriet and Mark C. Regets (2002). “The Elusive Concept of Immigrant Quality.” IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 631.   
 
Duleep, Harriet and Mark C. Regets (1999). “Immigrants and Human Capital Investment.” AER 
Papers and Proceedings 89 (May): 186-191. 
 
Frey, William H. (2002). “Census 2000 Reveals New Native-Born and Foreign-Born Shifts Across 
U.S.” PSC Research Report No. 02-520 (August).  
 
Frey, William H. (1995). “Immigration and Internal Migration ‘Flight’ from US Metropolitan Areas: 
Toward a New Demographic Balkanisation.” Urban Studies 32 (May): 733-757. 
 
Friedberg, Rachel M. (2000). “You Can’t Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the 
Portability of Human Capital.” Journal of Labor Economics 18 (April): 221-251. 
 
Friedberg, Rachel M. (2001). “The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (November): 1373-1408. 
 
Gallo, Carmenza, and Thomas R. Bailey (1996). “Social Networks and Skills-Based Immigration 
Policy.” In Immigrants and Immigration Policy: Individual Skills, Family Ties, and Group Identities, 
ed. Harriett O. Duleep and Phanindra V. Wunnava. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 203-217. 
 
Greenwood, Michael J., and Gary L. Hunt (1995). “Economic Effects of Immigrants on Native and 
Foreign-Born Workers: Complementarity, Substitutability, and Other Channels of Influence.” 
Southern Economic Journal 61(April): 1076-1097. 
 
Greenwood, Michael J., John M. McDowell, and Eloise Trabka (1991). “Conducting Descriptive and 
Analytical Research with the Immigration and Naturalization Service Public Use Tapes.” Journal of 
Economic and Social Measurement 17: 131-153. 
 
Hamermesh, Daniel S. (1993). Labor Demand. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Hanson, Gordon H., and Matthew J. Slaughter (2002). “Labor-market adjustment in open 
economies: Evidence from US States.” Journal of International Economics 57 (June): 3-29. 
 
Holmes, Charles W. (2000). “Immigrants Caught in INS Backlog: Promised Land on Hold While the 
Agency from Hell Works to Reduce a Flood of Immigrant Applications.” Contra Costa Times, July 
2, A6. 
 
Hu, Wei-Yin (2000). “Immigrant Earnings Assimilation: Estimates from Longitudinal Data.” AER 
Papers and Proceedings 90 (May): 368-372. 
   25
Jaeger, David A. (1996). “Skill Differences and the Effect of Immigrants on the Wages of Natives.” 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper No. 273, March. 
 
Jaeger, David A. (2000). “Local Labor Markets, Admission Categories, and Immigrant Location 
Choice.” Hunter College and Graduate School CUNY Working Paper, June. 
 
Jasso, Guillermina; Massey, Douglas S; Rosenzweig, Mark R. and James P. Smith (2000). 
“Assortative Mating among Married New Legal Immigrants to the United States: Evidence from the 
New Immigrant Survey Pilot.” International Migration Review 34 (Summer): 443-459. 
 
Jasso, Guillermina, and Mark R. Rosenzweig (1995). “Do Immigrants Screened for Skills Do Better 
than Family Reunification Immigrants?” International Migration Review 29 (Spring): 85-111. 
 
Johnson, George A. (1998). “The Impact of Immigration on Income Distribution among Minorities.” 
In Help or Hindrance? The Economic Implications of Immigration for African Americans, ed. Daniel 
S. Hamermesh and Frank D. Bean. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 17-50.  
 
Kritz, Mary M., and Douglas T. Gurak (2001). “The Impact of Immigration on the Internal 
Migration of Natives and Immigrants.” Demography 38 (February): 133-145. 
 
LaLonde, Robert J., and Robert H. Topel (1991). "Labor Market Adjustments to Increased 
Immigration." In Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market, ed. John M. Abowd and Richard B. 
Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 167-199. 
 
Leamer, Edward E. (2000). “What’s the Use of Factor Contents?”  Journal of International 
Economics 50 (February): 17-49. 
 
Mincer, Jacob (1978). “Family Migration Decisions.” Journal of Political Economy 86 (October): 
749-773. 
 
Mosisa, Abraham T. (2002). “The Role of Foreign Born Workers in the US Economy.” Monthly 
Labor Review (May): 3-14. 
 
Ottaviano, Gianmarco and Giovanni Peri (2005). “Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory 
and Evidence from the U.S.” NBER Working Paper 11672, September. 
 
Schoeni, Robert F. (1997). “The Effects of Immigration on the Employment and Wages of Native 
Workers: Evidence from the 1970s and 1980s.” Mimeo, RAND. 
 
Smith, James P., and Barry Edmonston (1997). The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and 









   
   New LPRs as % all workers   Spouse LPRs as % New LPRs Natives’ 
Occupation group     All    Adjusting     Arriving     All      Adjusting   Arriving  Average wage   
Professionals  .25  .12  .13            14  8  20  19.04 
  (.24) (.12) (.14)  (35)  (27)  (40)  (2.44) 
Service  workers  .16 .07 .10  19  17  20  10.78 
  (.20) (.11) (.11)  (39)  (38)  (40)  (1.41) 
Manual  laborers  .26 .11 .15  14  10  17  12.13 
  (.41) (.25) (.26)  (35)  (31)  (37)  (1.50)   
Note: Shown are sample means (standard deviations).  Service workers include sales, service, and 
clerical occupations; manual laborers include precision craft and repair occupations, laborers, and 
farm workers.  Spouse LPRs only include immigrants admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens and not 
adjusting from work or student visas.  The average wage is the real average hourly wage of natives, 
computed as usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for salaried workers and deflated 
using the PCE.  The data are for an unbalanced panel of 283 metropolitan areas during 1994-2000 
for a total of 5205 observations (1735 observations per occupation). 
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Table 2 
Mean Characteristics of New LPRs: Spouses of U.S. Citizens and Others 
 
      
 Spouses  Others   
Age 31.8  37.2 
 (7.9)  (10.9) 
Female .44  .40 
 (.50)  (.50) 
From Mexico  .15  .10 
 (.36)  (.30) 
From China  .04  .08 
 (.19)  (.27) 
From the Philippines  .06  .06 
 (.24)  (.23) 
Professionals .30  .37 
 (.46)  (.48) 
Service workers  .37  .29 
 (.48)  (.46) 
Manual laborers  .33  .34 
 (.47)  (.47) 
Total sample size  315,987  1,137,689   
 
Note: Shown are sample means (standard deviations) for new lawful permanent residents (LPRs) 
who report an occupation.  Spouse LPRs only include immigrants admitted as spouses of U.S. 
citizens and not adjusting from work or student visas; all others are included in column 2. 
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Table 3 
Estimates of the Relationship between Natives’ Wages and New LPRs 
 
    
Occupation group  (1)  (2)  (3)   
OLS 
Professionals .050**  .039**  .037* 
 (.009)  (.011)  (.015) 
Service workers  .030*  .017  .011 
 (.013)  (.014)  (.018) 
Manual laborers  -.016**  -.020**  -.021** 
 (.006)  (.006)  (.007) 
2SLS 
Professionals .039**  .018  .012 
 (.011)  (.015)  (.021) 
Service workers  .028*  -.001  -.013 
 (.014)  (.019)  (.024) 
Manual laborers  -.015*  -.026**  -.030** 
 (.007)  (.008)  (.011) 
Area-specific time trends  No  Yes  No 
Area* year fixed effects  No  No  Yes   
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients from OLS or two-stage least squared regressions of average 
natives’ wages on the share of workers who are new immigrants in an occupation, area, and year.  In 
the 2SLS regressions, the immigrant share is instrumented using the number of new immigrants who 
are admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens and are not adjusting from work or student visas relative to 
all workers in an occupation, area, and year.  The regressions also include controls for average 
worker characteristics (see text for details), fixed effects for area, occupation and year, and other 
variables as indicated.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses and N=5205. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  29
Table 4 
Estimates of the Relationship between Natives’ Wages and New LPRs, by Adjustment Status 
 
   
   Adjusting  status     New  arrivals   
Occupation  group  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
OLS 
Professionals  .070**  .058** .056** .116** .105** .119** 
  (.016)  (.017) (.021) (.020) (.023) (.028) 
Service workers  .024  .011  .008    .093**  .080**  .088** 
  (.020)  (.021) (.024) (.026) (.027) (.034) 
Manual  laborers  -.026**  -.027** -.027** -.008  -.011  -.006 
  (.007)  (.007) (.009) (.011) (.012) (.014) 
2SLS 
Professionals  .044*  .016 .004 .096**  .084**  .094** 
  (.021)  (.025) (.038) (.021) (.028) (.034) 
Service workers  .035  -.001  -.020    .075**  .055  .053 
  (.023)  (.030) (.040) (.028) (.034) (.041) 
Manual  laborers  -.026**  -.035** -.040** -.010  -.016  -.015 
  (.008)  (.010) (.015) (.012) (.014) (.015) 
Area-specific  time  trends  No Yes No No Yes No 
Area* year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes   
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients from OLS or 2SLS regressions of average natives’ wages on 
the share of workers who either are adjusting to legal permanent resident status (columns 1-3) or are 
legal permanent residents newly arriving the U.S. (columns 4-6) in an occupation, area, and year.  
The regressions also include controls for average worker characteristics (see text for details), fixed 
effects for area, occupation and year, and other variables as indicated.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses and N=5205. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 Appendix Table 1 
First Stage for 2SLS Estimates of the Relationship between Natives’ Wages and New LPRs 
 
   
   All     Adjusting  status      Newly  arriving   
Occupation group              (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)   
 
Professionals  4.496**  4.273** 3.386** 5.485** 5.839** 4.852**  3.958**  3.105**  2.844** 
  (.311)  (.522) (.649) (.462) (.791) (1.199)  (.282)  (.244)  (.285) 
Service  workers  3.333**  2.703** 1.919** 3.341** 3.515** 2.838**      3.147**  2.239**  1.793** 
  (.271)  (.491) (.615) (.333) (.549) (.822)  (.241)  (.264)  (.356) 
Manual  laborers  4.292**  4.084** 3.811** 4.892** 5.020** 4.803**  4.022**  3.753**  3.630** 
  (.418)  (.506) (.526) (.973)  (1.072) (1.084)  (.294)  (.281)  (.293) 
F-test  for  joint  90.35 30.53 38.65  65.74 22.50  8.08  87.26  79.58  77.93 
significance (.00)  (0.00)  (.00)  (.00) (.00) (.00)  (.00)  (.00)  (.00) 
Area-specific  time  trends  No Yes No No Yes No  No  Yes  No 
Area* year fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes   
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients from first stage regressions of the fraction of workers who are immigrants on the fraction of 
workers who are admitted as spouses of U.S. citizens and are newly arriving or adjusting from non-work, non-student visas in an 
occupation, area, and year.  The regressions also include controls for average worker characteristics (see text for details), fixed effects 
for area, occupation and year, and other variables as indicated.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses (p-value for the F-test).  
Each column is from a separate regression with 5205 observations. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 